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 ABSTRACT 
This study applies Deutsch’s security community framework to the states of 
Southeast Asia in order to assess whether or not, as at September 2002, 
there exist dependable expectations of peaceful change. The study has three 
primary goals. The first is to develop the framework so it may better reflect 
the realities of interstate and communal relations in Southeast Asia. The 
second is to assess whether or not Southeast Asia has in fact moved beyond 
the construction of a nascent security community where there exists 
adequate empirical evidence to suggest a future sustainable course towards 
‘dependable expectations of peaceful change’. The third seeks to analyse the 
potential for Southeast Asia, as a community of states, to evolve to the 
higher tiers of integration and be characterised as a mature security 
community, where disputes between states and state-elites will be resolved 
without recourse to violence. In investigating these tasks, the dissertation 
considers a broad range of issues, including (but not limited to): the 
multilateral security frameworks embracing the region; the impact of ethnic 
and religious tensions as well as non-traditional security issues (with a focus 
here on narcotics and piracy); and the impact of terrorism and the recent 
economic crisis on the normative behaviours and ideologies of state elites 
throughout the region. It is found that while a substantial degree of 
interaction, integration and cooperation has developed in Southeast Asia, 
these developments have been insufficient to alleviate a number of 
traditional security issues and tensions (such as border and territorial 
conflicts). Consequently, there exists only a transient sense of expectations 
of peaceful change throughout Southeast Asia and this level of integration is 
characterised by the dissertation to represent nothing more than the 
embryonic phase of a security community’s evolution.  
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION: RESEARCH TOPIC AND KEY QUESTIONS 
Over the past thirty years, Southeast Asia has distinguished itself as a region 
of diversity with vast potential based on an abundance of resources. Until the 
‘Asian economic crisis of 1997-1998’, it was also considered to be a region of 
dynamic economic growth and rapid development. While some states in 
Southeast Asia now may be regaining their reputation as ‘economic tigers’ 
since 1998,1 future economic progress is unlikely to be uniform. The original 
ASEAN member-states may have avoided large-scale military confrontation, 
but there are now newer ASEAN member-states that had previously been in 
armed conflict with each other. The claim has been made that these new 
member states have been ‘successfully engaged’ and now embrace the 
ASEAN norm of peaceful change. Notwithstanding the adverse affects of the 
economic crisis, as well as the internal turmoil that Indonesia has experienced 
over the past few years, many assessments of the region have found the 
likelihood of interstate armed conflict to be highly improbable. However, 
given the flourishing narcotics industry in the Golden Triangle; the cold to 
bitter relations that exist between Singapore and Malaysia; and the conflicting 
claims in the South China Sea is such a contention defendable? Within the 
discipline of international relations, this is one of the core issues that security 
                                                 
1 Thailand, Malaysia and Singapore. Singapore was only minimally affected by the economic 
crisis.  
 
 community frameworks (SCFs) seek to address. Yet, to date, most security 
community frameworks applied to Southeast Asia have primarily aimed at 
illustrating the success with which the region has integrated over the past few 
decades. While this dissertation does not refute these studies or their claims, it 
does contend that the framework may equally be applied to a region for the 
purpose of critically understanding the current limitations to dependable 
expectations of peaceful change in Southeast Asia.  
In this context, the present study has three primary investigative tasks. The 
first explores how security community frameworks can be improved in the 
sense of better reflecting the realities of interstate and communal relations 
with a view to evaluating the dependability of peaceful relations between the 
states of Southeast Asia. Based on the insights obtained in the first 
investigative task, the second critically evaluates whether or not Southeast 
Asia can, as some analysts claim, be properly characterised as a ‘nascent 
security community’.2 The third task assesses the potential for the 
communities and states within Southeast Asia to integrate to a level that might 
be properly defined as a ‘mature security community’.3 When a region satisfies 
                                                 
2 Some examples include the comments of: Amitav Acharya, "Collective Identity and Conflict 
Management in Southeast Asia," in Security Communities, ed. Emanuel Adler and Michael 
Barnett (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), Emanuel Adler and Michael 
Barnett, "A Framework for the Study of Security Communities," in Security Communities, ed. 
Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), Yuen 
Foong Khong, "ASEAN and the Southeast Asian Security Complex," in Regional Orders: 
Building Security in the New World, ed. David A. and Morgan Lake, Patrick M. (Pennsylvania: 
Pennsylvania State University Press, 1997), p.339, Raimo Vayrynen, Stable Peace through 
Security Communities? Steps Towards Theory-Building [Occasional Paper] (The Joan B. Krock 
Institute for International Peace Studies, June 11, 2001 2000 [cited September 10 2001]). 
3 Where there is virtually no possibility of military conflict. See the definitional framework in 
Chapter II.  
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 the requirements of a mature security community, it is contended that the 
theory merges with the practice to the extent that there exist long-term 
expectations of peaceful change throughout the region. At this point in a 
region’s evolution, the primary focus of the leadership of the regional states 
shifts towards the consideration of both personal security (e.g., freedom from 
oppression and exploitation) and social security (e.g., law and order and the 
absence of transnational crime).4  
In exploring these issues as important aspects of the investigative tasks above, 
the following central questions frame the analysis undertaken with regard to 
the Southeast Asian region:    
1. What are the key concepts and terms that need to be defined and 
applied in this study; and what is the relevant literature and other 
sources of information concerning them? (Chapter I) 
2. What appropriate theoretical framework of analysis can be devised 
to address the key dimensions of the study? (Chapter II) 
3. How has the historical strategic security architecture served to 
facilitate or restrain the creation of dependable expectations of 
peaceful change within the region? (Chapter III) 
4. How have the events of the Asian economic crisis, and the terrorist 
attacks of 11 September 2001 impacted on elite level normative 
behaviour and, more broadly, on the contemporary strategic security 
architecture? (Chapter IV) 
5. How do the concepts of collective identity formation and domestic 
security relate to, and develop, dependable expectations of peaceful 
change? (Chapter V) 
6. How do non-traditional security issues interlink with the notions of 
traditional and comprehensive security, as well as the formation of 
dependable expectations of peaceful change within Southeast Asia? 
(Chapter VI) 
                                                 
4 These concepts and terms are further defined and contextualized within Chapter II.  
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 7. How have the bilateral and multilateral responses pertaining to 
issues of conflict within Southeast Asia, and beyond, impacted on an 
assessment of collective identity formation and dependable 
expectations of peaceful change within the region? (Chapter VII). 
8. How do the various components of a security community (such as 
traditional security, non-traditional security and communal relations) 
interrelate with one another in substantiating or detracting from 
dependable expectations of peaceful change? (cumulative analysis 
throughout the chapters and concluding in Chapter VII)  
9. In terms of a security community framework, how can the region be 
categorised today? (cumulative analysis throughout chapters and 
concluding in Chapter VII) 
10. What are the primary challenges faced by Southeast Asia in 
becoming a security community within the foreseeable future? 
(cumulative analysis throughout chapters and concluding in Chapter 
VII) 
Generally, these central questions provide a chapter structure for the study. 
While for each chapter there is a central question setting the primary focus of 
analysis, questions 8, 9 and 10 run through the whole study as threads to the 
analysis. The first question is considered in this introductory chapter, while 
question 2 is considered in Chapter II. Further, while the investigative tasks 
and central questions are representative of the general thrust of the enquiry, 
there exist a number of sub-questions, or issues, that are too many in number 
to be summarised here and will be raised, where feasible, at the appropriate 
locations throughout the dissertation. Below, a section entitled Research 
Approach provides a brief description of the individual chapters and how the 
various components of each chapter address, comprehend, examine, and 
answer each of the central questions.  
It is necessary to make one explanatory qualification before moving into a 
review of the literature. The accuracy of any analysis in the realm of security 
 4
 studies, let alone a security community framework, decreases proportionately to the 
number of actors extant within the analytical model. That is, the attempt by 
the political scientist to understand ‘the political’ follows a kind of ‘reverse 
probability’ whereby analytical accuracy decreases proportionately as the 
sample number (of actors) increases. Therefore, as the security community 
framework discussed here deals with a large number of actors (states, 
transnational communities, NGOs, and so on), the level of analysis required 
has proportionately increased in complexity and is mirrored by the ensuing 
discussions within the dissertation. 
Literature Review: The Emergence of the Concepts and their 
Definitions 
The emergence of a ‘security community’ as a conceptual framework is 
largely accredited to the research of Karl Deutsch and associates in 1957. 
While Deutsch developed the initial framework and its composite notions, 
the actual founder of the term was Richard van Wagnen in the early 1950s.5 
This work was the first substantive challenge to the realist paradigm.6 A 
neglected connection to the framework is its relationship to the concept of 
an ‘international society’,7 a concept proposed by the English school of 
thought and one which has its roots in the work of Grotius and his famous 
                                                 
5 Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett, "Security Communities in Theoretical Perspective," in 
Security Communities, ed. Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1998), p.3. 
6 Acharya, "Collective Identity and Conflict Management in Southeast Asia," p.201. 
7 Barry Buzan, "Book Review: Adler and Barnett, 'Security Communities'," International Affairs 76, 
no. 1 (2000), p.154. 
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 book, De Jure Belli et Pacis (The Law of War and Peace) in 1625.8 In terms of 
international theory, an international society sits on the constructivist end of 
the spectrum, that is, unlike Neo-Realism which places emphasis only on 
material structures (such as national interests, maximum gains and so on), 
‘international society’ emphasises the value of a normative structure (for 
example, socially constructed norms of peaceful interaction) in addition to 
the material.9 Central to the idea of an international society is the belief that 
states can form a society where there is emphasis on common norms for the 
conduct of their relations and recognition of their common interest in 
maintaining these arrangements.10 The connection of this so-called ‘English 
School of Thought’11 with a ‘security community framework’ is found in 
Deutsch’s assertion that a security community will exist where there are 
‘dependable expectations of peaceful change’.12 According to Deutsch, the 
existence of such ‘expectations’ will most likely exist whenever two or more 
states become integrated to an extent that there is an overall sense of 
community, ‘which in turn, creates the assurance that they will settle their 
                                                 
8 The Random House Encyclopaedia, ed. James Mitchell, 3rd ed. (New York: Random House, 1990) 
p.2,247. 
9 Adler and Barnett, "Security Communities in Theoretical Perspective," p.10. 
10 In other words, they move beyond self-gain and self-interest – from relative gain towards 
more absolute gain. Ian McLean, Concise Dictionary of Politics (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1996) p.248. 
11 Mohammed Ayoob, "From Regional System to Regional Order," Australian Journal of 
International Affairs 53, no. 3 (1999) p.247. 
12 Karl W. Deutsch et al., Political Community and the North Atlantic Area: International Organisation in 
the Light of Historical Experience (New York: Greenwood Press, 1957) p.5. 
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 differences short of war’.13 Therefore, the ‘community of states’ that form 
the security community abides by norms of peaceful conduct and in fact 
anticipates a stable peace. Deutsch articulated his framework in the 
following manner: 
A security-community is a group of people which become 
“integrated”… By integration we mean the attainment, within 
a territory, of a “sense of community” and of institutions and 
practices strong enough and widespread enough to assure, for 
a “long” time, dependable expectations of “peaceful change” 
among its population. …By sense of community we mean a 
belief on the part of the individuals in a group that they have 
come to agreement on at least this one point: that common 
social problems must and can be resolved by processes of 
“peaceful change.”…By peaceful change we mean the 
resolution of social problems, normally by institutionalised 
procedures, without resort to large-scale physical force.14  
Adler and Barnett claim that the study of a security community framework 
has been often cited but rarely emulated.15 Figure 1.1 on p.10 is indicative of 
a changing process in international relations theory where the imaginary 
Idealist/Realist divide has started to dissipate. As it demonstrates, a security 
community framework – and its constructivist approach – has been 
increasingly applied since the end of the Cold War. Where once such 
concepts were simply stereotyped as a minority school of thought by 
                                                 
13 Adler and Barnett, "Security Communities in Theoretical Perspective," p.3. 
14 Under the definition provided by Deutsch, a security community may exist between 
communities within states or across states – a security community is in fact non-territorial. 
However, for the purpose of this study and in light of its modern application, the study will 
limit the focus and application of security community frameworks to inter-state relations. 
Deutsch et al., Political Community and the North Atlantic Area: International Organisation in the 
Light of Historical Experience p.5. 
15 Adler and Barnett, "Security Communities in Theoretical Perspective," p.9. 
 7
 ‘utopianist idealists’, the notion of a security community framework has now 
entered mainstream thought, and debate – both in academia and in various 
governments across the globe. Because Adler and Barnett argue for the 
superiority of security community frameworks and the constructivist 
paradigm, they therefore make the contention that the realist-idealist divide 
is nothing more than artificial. Adler and Barnet summarise their contention 
in the following manner: 
Theories of international politics, therefore, can and should 
occupy a pragmatic middle ground between the view that 
identities and international practices cannot change, and the 
view that everything is possible. They should be able to blend 
power, interests, and pessimism with norms, a dynamic view of 
international politics, and moderate optimism about the 
possibility of structural change that enhances human interests 
across borders.16 
                                                 
16 This is because the study of security community framework incorporates elements of both the 
realist and idealist paradigms. Idealism has been vicariously labelled utopianism, rationalism 
and/or liberalism. It emphasises the importance ‘moral values, legal norms, 
internationalism and harmony of interests…’, Graham Evans and Jeffrey Newnham, eds., 
The Penguin Dictionary of International Relations (London: Penguin Books, 1998) p.235. Idealism 
holds that universal and long term peace is both a possible and obtainable goal. In contrast 
to this, realism contends that the international system is characterised by a system of 
anarchy; that states are generally rational actors but such rationalism is confined to the 
achievement of national interests and selfish desires of maximising political gain. The way 
the security community concept examines the dynamic relationship between the power of 
the state, international organisations and institutions (including non-governmental 
organisations) and the various changes in security practices has resulted in the 
incorporation of aspects of both the realist and idealist paradigms. Adler and Barnett, "A 
Framework for the Study of Security Communities," pp.14-15. 
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 Figure 1.1: The Re-emergence of Security Community 
Framework Discourse 
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Compiled by Author from the Ebscohost Database, October 2001. 
Advocates of the security community concept have ranged from the Office 
of the Minister for Foreign Affairs and Trade in Australia to the 
Commander in Chief, US Pacific Command, Admiral Dennis C. Blair.17 The 
re-emergence of the concept has been the result of a number of factors. 
One of these is that the collapse of the Soviet Union did create a new world 
order that ended bi-polarity in the global system of states. The world did 
not, however, revert back to the old Westphalian system of a multipolar 
balance of power but, rather, to a system generally seeking collective 
governance. That is, there exists a preference for a system of governance 
                                                 
17 Interview by Author with Amanda Hawkins and Bradley Haynes, Office of the Minister for Foreign 
Affairs (Canberra), 11 July 2001. Dennis C. Admiral Blair, "United States Pacific Command" 
(University of California, San Diego, 13 April 2000), Dennis C. Admiral Blair and John T. 
Hanley Jr., "From Wheels to Webs: Reconstructing Asia-Pacific Security Arrangements," 
The Washington Quarterly 24, no. 1 (2001). 
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 that looks more to an ideal of institutionalism and integration between states 
– an example of this would be the European Union. Indeed, war and 
uncertainty continue to persist, but rather than existing primarily between 
states, conflict and uncertainty has developed within and across states – such 
as with terrorism and transnational crime. While a great deal of scholarly 
literature has been produced on the topic of why this is so,18 it is sufficient 
to state that for the purpose of this dissertation, a new world system of 
integration19 has created the prospect, and the belief, that ‘dependable 
expectations of change can exist between states’ and that Deutsch’s ‘security 
community framework’ should be accepted as a part of the mainstream of 
international relations theory.   
According to the scholarly literature, there are two types of security 
community, an ‘amalgamated security community’ and a ‘pluralistic security 
community’.20 Both categories maintain the notion of dependable 
expectations of peaceful change, but an amalgamated security community is 
said to exist where states formally unify, such as in the case of the United 
States of America (USA). By contrast, a pluralistic security community exists 
                                                 
18 For a general discussion of this topic see: David Lake and Patrick Morgan, ed., Regional Orders: 
Building Security in the New World (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 
1997). 
19 This is taken to mean integration as between states, as opposed to any notion of fragmentation 
within states. 
20 Adler and Barnett, "Security Communities in Theoretical Perspective.", Arie Kacowicz, 
Regionalization, Globalization, and Nationalism: Convergent, Divergent or Overlapping? [Journal 
Article] (Alternatives: Social Transformation and Humane Governance, Oct-Dec 1999 
[cited 15 May 2001]); available from <http://globalvgw11.global.epnet.com>. 
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 where states preserve their sovereignty. This dissertation will only examine 
the application of a ‘pluralistic security community’ framework, as it 
represents the developments taking place at the international and regional 
levels, including the Southeast Asian region. In its contemporary form, 
Adler and Barnett define a pluralistic security community (henceforth 
referred to as a security community) ‘… as a transnational region comprised of 
sovereign states whose people maintain dependable expectations of peaceful 
change’.21 
This simplified definition, while aptly stating the essence of a (pluralistic) 
security community, does require one clarification. Adler’s use of the word 
‘region’ can invoke the possibility of several theories such as Buzan's 
‘regional security complex’ framework22 or Thompson’s ‘regional 
subsystem’s theory’.23 An in-depth discussion as to the characteristics or 
requirements of a region would, however, be superfluous as a security 
community does not require a geographical region to exist. Rather, it can 
exist between just two or more states, such as the security community of 
Australia and New Zealand;24 Australia, New Zealand and Singapore;25 or 
                                                 
21 Adler and Barnett, "A Framework for the Study of Security Communities," p.30. 
22 Barry Buzan, People, States and Fear, 2nd edition ed. (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1991) p.190, 
Barry Buzan, "The Southeast Asian Security Complex," Contemporary Southeast Asia 10, no. 1 
(1988). 
23 William Thompson, “The Regional Subsystem: A Conceptual Explication and a Propositional 
Inventory,” International Studies Quarterly 17, no.1 p.101, cited in Ayoob, "From Regional 
System to Regional Order," p.249. 
24 Amitav Acharya, Constructing a Security Community in Southeast Asia: ASEAN and the Problem of 
Regional Order (London: Routledge, 2001) p.20. 
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 the United States and Canada.26 The relationship between the concepts of 
‘security community’ and ‘region’ will be discussed in greater depth in 
Chapter II.   
The Neo-Kantians and the Democratic Security Community 
Linked to the constructivist school of thought on a security community is the 
Kantian notion of ‘Democratic Peace’.27 The Kantians do not discount 
security community frameworks, but rather, advocate democracy as a 
necessary precondition to their existence. Therefore, in applying security 
community frameworks, the Kantians usually refer to it as a ‘democratic 
security community’. The Kantian school of thought stems from Immanuel 
Kant and his classic 1795 work Perpetual Peace. Kant’s philosophy solidly 
supported the Universalist camp and the primacy of the rule of law. That is to 
say, that there exist certain grand norms that are universally applicable to all 
peoples on earth. Examples of this would include the right to eat and the right 
to be left alone and unharmed. The latter is aptly surmised by Justice Louis D. 
Brandeis: ‘[t]he right to be left alone is the most comprehensive of rights and 
the right most valued in civilised man’. For example, the Universalist 
approach and the rule of law as a philosophy would conflict with any 
                                                                                                                        
25 Interview by Author with Kwa Chong Guan, IDSS (Singapore), 5 December 2001. 
26 Buzan, People, States and Fear pp.114-5. 
27 Alexander Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1999) p.299. 
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 justification of an ‘ASEAN way’,28 particularly if the norms that stem from its 
existence acted to negate the rights of the individual and society.  
One of the most fundamental contentions behind the notion of a democratic 
peace is that democracies ‘are significantly less likely to fight wars with each 
other’.29 There are three primary reasons behind this contention. The first is 
that the flow and type of information in democratic (pluralistic) institutions (as 
opposed to dictatorships or oligarchies) leads to a better, more rational, 
decision making process that increases the likelihood of a ‘no-war’ result.30 
The second factor, one that is partly related to the first, is that democratic 
institutions emphasise parliamentary responsibility and place conditions on 
when, how and to what degree a political leader can act. The leader of a 
democratic government can rarely exercise the right to wage war without the 
support of at least the executive, the legislature and eventually, the people (at 
least by way of election). Thirdly, there has been a recent expansion of the 
‘democratic peace theory’ to include considerations of economic 
interdependence. This is because democratic states now tend to be more 
economically open, giving increased latitude to the theory of economic 
interdependence.31 While this argument has been raised in an abundance of 
                                                 
28 Such as the principles of non-intervention, consensus, regional and national resilience. Defined 
in detail within Chapter III. 
29 John Wiggs Patty and Roberto A. Weber, "Agreeing to Fight: An Explanation of the 
Democratic Peace," (Carnegie Mellon University, 2001), p.2. 
30 Ibid., p.1. 
31 John R. Oneal and Bruce M. Russett, "The Classic Liberals Were Right: Democracy, 
Interdependence, and Conflict, 1950-1985," International Studies Quarterly 41 (1997): p.267-8.  
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 Kantian literature, there has been little by way of empirical evidence that has 
been utilised to justify this contention.32 
Even in stepping away from the Kantian view of a security community, it has 
been claimed that the major problem in applying security community 
frameworks (herein labelled SCF) to the developing world is an implicit 
assumption that ‘such communities require a quintessential liberal-democratic 
milieu featuring significant economic interdependence and political 
pluralism’.33 Amitav Acharya, in his application of SCFs to Southeast Asia, 
ranges between dismissing democracy as a necessary prerequisite to the 
formation of a security community to only briefly outlining what he sees as an 
implicit assumption by European academics that democracy is a necessary 
prerequisite.34 However, his works have yet to provide an in-depth critique of 
this ‘European’ assumption.35 A major reason for this may be because of a 
perception, by a significant percentage of colleagues within the region, that 
Acharya himself is overly Eurocentric.36 By contrast, Zhiqun Zhu does 
                                                 
32 It has been further argued by Alexander Wendt that the ‘democratic peace’ notion has never 
attempted to ‘tap into’ the causes as to why such a pattern exists: see, Wendt, Social Theory of 
International Politics p.68. 
33 Acharya, Constructing a Security Community in Southeast Asia: ASEAN and the Problem of Regional 
Order p.31. 
34 Acharya, "Collective Identity and Conflict Management in Southeast Asia," p.199. 
35 Acharya, Constructing a Security Community in Southeast Asia: ASEAN and the Problem of Regional 
Order p.31. 
36 Interview by Author with Joseph Liow, IDSS (Singapore), 7 December 2002; Interview by 
Author with Andrew Tan, IDSS (Singapore), 5 December 2002. Interview by Author with 
Kanala Khantaprab, Government of Thailand (Bangkok), 26 December 2002. 
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 expand on Acharya’s arguments and acknowledges the difficulty for countries 
to share similar values and expectations when they have different political and 
economic systems.37 It is not the aim of this dissertation to provide a 
substantive analysis of the relationship between democratic systems of 
governance and the facilitation of both dependable expectations of peaceful 
change and collective identity formation. However, the dissertation does refer 
to the contrasts that exist in comparing the ability of democratic governments 
with authoritarian regimes and their reciprocal ability to adapt to political and 
economic crises. It is hoped that these comparisons may provide some 
valuable background to future research and analysis on the topic. 
The Research Approach 
This dissertation applies the disciplines of political science and international 
relations theory throughout its analysis. This by no means narrows the scope 
or depth of the dissertation’s analysis, because the political scientist’s field of 
study is not constrained by a ‘self-denying ordinance against the use of 
materials and techniques of other social scientists’.38 However, keeping the 
framework and analysis within the discipline of political science does provide 
a logical coherence and requires justified derivations. The discipline of 
political science also places a premium on the historical factors behind why an 
                                                 
37 Zhiqun Zhu, "Prospect for Integration in Pacific-Asia," Asian Profile 28, no. 6 (2000): p.517. 
38 Kenneth Waltz, "Man, the State, and War," in War, ed. Lawrence Freedman (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1994), p.74. 
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 event is so.39 This requires, above all else, an adequate degree of evidence and 
the absence of ‘emotional attachments, personal hunches and [merely] 
intuitive understanding’.40 One criticism that can be directed at the discipline 
is its emphasis on quantitative research (so as to maintain objectivity and a 
‘logical coherence’) at the expense, or neglect, of qualitative research such as 
in-depth interviews. However, Fiona Devine contends that the use of 
qualitative in combination with quantitative methods should, and does, play an 
important role in political science.41 Therefore, in agreement with Devine, the 
dissertation has utilised both qualitative and quantitative methods of research 
whilst seeking to maintain the requisite degree of objectivity as demanded by 
the discipline of political science. The statistical information utilised in the 
dissertation comes from a broad range of primary and secondary sources, 
from information on drug production (United Nations Drug Control 
Program) to military expenditure (the United States Central Intelligence 
Agency). In terms of qualitative research, forty-one in-depth interviews were 
                                                 
39 Gerry Stoker, "Introduction," in Theory and Methods in Political Science, ed. David Marsh and 
Gerry Stoker (Houndmills: MacMillan Press Ltd and St. Martins Press, 1995), p.3. 
40 A Zuckerman, Doing Political Science (Boulder, Colorado: Westview, 1991) p.3. cited in, Stoker, 
"Introduction," p.3. 
41 For further discussion of this issue see, Fiona Devine, "Methodological Questions - 
Qualitative Analysis," in Theory and Methods in Political Science, ed. David Marsh and Gerry 
Stoker (Houndmills: MacMillan Press Ltd and St. Martins Press, 1995), pp.138-9. To 
illustrate the importance of qualitative research Anthony Seldon provides some examples of 
in-depth interviews that have provided vital facts unavailable by any other means. Two of 
these examples are found in the collection of information that is not yet available on public 
record, such as Paul Johnson’s The Suez War (1957) and Lawrence Freedman’s Britain and 
the Falklands War (1988). As Seldon states, these authors left little to the imagination and 
without which readers would have had to have waited until 1987 and 2013, respectively, for 
the official release of classified information pertaining to the topics, Anthony Seldon, 
Contemporary History (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1988) p.4. 
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 conducted and over one-hundred academics, strategists and government 
representatives were contacted for the purpose of finding answers to the 
questions raised by the dissertation’s research. The two sub-sections below 
provide some further insights as to the limitations, structure and the various 
methods employed in the completion of the dissertation.  
Limitations of the Research and Further Considerations 
While this dissertation addresses a wide variety of issues relevant to the 
establishment of a security community in Southeast Asia, the work done to 
date is suggestive of a need to undertake further empirical study and apply 
various research techniques in the future. One example is the use of surveys 
to ascertain community and regional perceptions by people at the communal 
level of analysis. Initial studies might focus on the more developed regional 
countries such as Singapore, Malaysia and Brunei. Such research might also 
utilise mathematical plotting similar to game system theories. This might entail 
the establishment of a rating system to provide a ‘score’ for each of the 
micro-components to a security community (i.e., language compatibility, intra-
regional trade, and so on) and then compare this, via an historical time line, 
with the establishment of, say, the European security community. The 
resulting graph plotted as a consequence of aggregating such data could 
permit the political scientist to ascertain a theoretical rate of integration over a 
set period (i.e., twenty years) and thereby predict an estimate of time that 
might be needed for this region to develop into a more mature security 
community.  
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 While the chapter titles serve as a broad guide to the issues analysed therein, 
they cannot completely delineate the central questions and investigative tasks 
of the study. This is because, to one degree or another, the range of issues 
considered is completely interrelated. Therefore, while the South China Sea 
disputes are considered as a ‘traditional security’ issue in Chapter VII, the 
basis of some of these tensions are also to be found in economic and human 
security considerations. As Chapter VII also considers bilateral state relations 
and exogenous influences, word restraints have inhibited any further 
consideration of these dynamics other than what is alluded to within Chapters 
IV, V and VI (such as economic security, domestic security and non-
traditional security issues). Furthermore, in order to understand the broad 
spectrum of issues pertinent to security community formation, analysis must 
be limited only to those factors related to (positively or negatively) two key 
components, namely, ‘dependable expectations of peaceful change’ and 
‘collective identity formation’. For example, in the consideration of the 
ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) and the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation 
(APEC), analysis is limited to the impact of the two organisations (as they 
pertain to confidence and security building measures and act as facilitators of 
dialogue) to state relations and peace within the region. 
Recent events, such as the Asian economic crisis of 1997-98 and the terrorist 
events of 11 September 2001, have propelled some of the developments and 
qualifications to the framework made in this study. Therefore, the 
development of SCFs is anything but a stagnant process. As regional and 
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 global environments change, it is likely that future scholars will be able to 
develop further insights on the application of the framework. The only 
components likely to be left unchanged are the broad requirements of the 
framework, such as the necessity of good inter-state relations and the 
presence of an interstate communal and elite level identity. This is because the 
absence of military tensions and/or conflict, as well as the absence of ethnic 
and religious tensions and/or violence (with the potential to develop into 
inter-state armed struggles), is fundamental to the Deutschian thesis and 
dependable expectations of peaceful change.   
This study covers the events up to and including the opening ceremony of the 
23rd General Assembly of the ASEAN Inter-Parliamentary Organisation 
(AIPO) in Hanoi on 10 September 2002. The necessity to place a time limit 
on the study is dictated by both word constraints and the complexity of the 
issues covered. Further, because of the constraints placed on a Masters level 
dissertation (both in time and words) this dissertation, regrettably, has had to 
remove several components from its consideration. Some of these included 
case studies on Indonesia/East Timor relations; Myanmar/Thailand relations; 
the environment and the impact of the haze; as well as a much larger 
assessment of the strategic goals and military capacity of China, and an in-
depth of analysis of the obstacles to security sector reform in Indonesia. It is 
hoped that future studies could look into, and develop, these areas as well as 
the multitude of additional issues and considerations that stem from the 
investigative tasks, central questions, and analysis of the study.   
 19
 The Chapters: Structure, Argumentation and Further Limitations  
To achieve the stated aims of the dissertation, Chapter II deals almost 
exclusively with the first investigative task and the second central question. It 
further refines the boundaries of analysis by elaborating and developing the 
aforementioned theories on SCFs. For reasons mentioned previously, SCFs 
are only just starting to come to the fore and it is important to distinctly label 
and define both the correlation between theory and empirical evidence that is 
necessary to the existence of a security community in Southeast Asia. In light 
of this goal, Chapter III considers the security architecture of Southeast Asia, 
and in so doing addresses the third central question to the study. It 
commences with a brief historical analysis of the development of a security 
framework for Southeast Asia after World War II. In relation to this, the 
chapter contextualises APEC and the ARF as multilateral organisations, with 
a traditional normative preference by the states of the region for bilateral 
dialogue in the resolution of security issues. Following this, there is a 
consideration of the relationship of both the ARF and APEC (as confidence 
and security building measures) to the establishment of dependable 
expectations of peaceful change in Southeast Asia.  
Chapter IV, in addressing the fourth central question, shifts the focus of 
examination to some of the contemporary security issues that have affected 
elite level normative behaviour within Southeast Asia. The first section 
considers the impact of the Southeast Asian economic crisis on the strategic 
security environment, and there is an examination of how the crisis may have 
 20
 created an opportunity for (or, perhaps, compelled a move towards) a 
paradigm shift in the normative values, behaviour and relations within the 
region. The second section gives some preliminary consideration to the 
impact of terrorism on the region and how the terrorist attacks of 11 
September 2001 may have further compelled this shift in elite level normative 
values and perceptions.  
In addressing the fifth central question, Chapter V assesses the relationship of 
collective identity formation and domestic security with regard to dependable 
expectations of peaceful change in Southeast Asia. The first section considers 
communal level collective identity formation, the second component of 
Deutsch’s theory. The emphasis of the section is on the obstacles to 
communal level collective identity formation within Southeast Asia and how 
communal relations are interdependent with elite level relations. In order to 
substantiate the propositions of the chapter, the section builds the SCF by 
incorporating the nation-building process as a sub-framework to the study. In 
light of this analysis, and the events considered within Chapter IV, section 
two provides a case study that considers how the negative and discriminatory 
nation-building process of Indonesia (i.e. elite level policy regarding the ethnic 
Chinese) has contributed to the current domestic insecurity faced by 
Indonesia. The case study then shifts its focus to security sector reform (a 
further development to the framework) and how, as an analytical tool, it 
assists in an evaluation of the breadth and scope of reform needed to 
overcome domestic insecurity. Additionally, the case study provides a brief 
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 synopsis on how a failure in Indonesia’s security sector reform process could 
impact on transnational relations and the comprehensive security of Southeast 
Asia.  
Chapter VI analyses how non-traditional security issues (as defined in Chapter 
II) are interrelated with SCF notions of traditional security. The chapter 
provides some insights on the level of cooperation and cooperative security 
extant within the region. The degree to which non-traditional security issues 
result in the formation of common goals and the implementation of 
cooperative efforts between states provides a valuable tool in assessing the 
level of integration and therefore, the application of SCFs.42  
Chapter VII addresses the sixth central question. The chapter is divided into 
two sections. The first considers two case studies on potential issues of 
conflict within Southeast Asia. The first case study covers the bilateral 
relations between Singapore and Malaysia. The second moves into a 
consideration of the multilateral tensions in the South China Sea. The section 
concludes with a discussion on how these two issues have served to enhance, 
or detract from, any finding of dependable expectations of peaceful change. 
The chapter then considers the potential impact, both direct and indirect, of 
exogenous factors on the formation of dependable expectations of peaceful 
change. In order to accomplish this task, and for the sake of brevity, the 
section incorporates China as a brief case study and links the analysis to 
                                                 
42 An analysis of the total spectrum of security concerns is beyond the scope of the dissertation 
but may be a possible area of future study within a PhD level dissertation. 
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 China’s impact on dependable expectations of peaceful change in the region. 
While direct threats, such as actual military confrontation, are move obvious 
in how they impact on Southeast Asia’s strategic security environment, the 
study also recognises how less direct threats (such as the economic 
ascendency of China), can detract from consensus and elite level collective 
identity formation in the region.   
Chapter VIII, the final and concluding chapter, entitled ‘Retrospect and 
Prospects’, provides a summation of all three investigative tasks and in turn, 
further addresses central questions 8 through to 10. The chapter commences 
with an analysis of how empirical observations from the study can be utilised 
to further strengthen and develop an analytical understanding of SCFs and 
their application to real life communal and elite level political relations (the 
first investigative task). On the basis of these insights, the chapter moves 
towards a consideration of the second investigative task and seeks to examine 
whether or not Southeast Asia has moved beyond the construction of a 
nascent security community.  
By taking into account the events and circumstances discussed within 
Chapters III through to VII, Chapter VIII also addresses the third 
investigative task and contends that the contemporary security architecture of 
Southeast Asia has provided state-elites with a remarkable opportunity to 
undertake a paradigm shift in inter-state normative relations leading to 
enhanced integration and interaction. If the political elites of the region follow 
this path, then both domestic and interstate security could develop to a point 
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 where the region could be characterised as a nascent or even ascendant 
security community, within the next ten to twenty years. In these 
circumstances, dependable expectations of peaceful change would be 
relatively assured and this would lead to a combination of strong investor 
confidence, rapid economic development and strong domestic security. 
Under these conditions, the peoples of Southeast Asia will be able to obtain 
both ‘personal’ and ‘social’ security including such basic things as freedom 
from oppression, exploitation; crime and poverty. The terms and concepts 
mentioned above are further explained in the next chapter.  
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 CHAPTER II 
THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE CONCEPT OF A 
SECURITY COMMUNITY 
This chapter addresses the second central question by examining both the 
theoretical foundations of a ‘security community’ (in terms of known 
paradigms) and the definition of its respective components. In line with the 
first investigative task, and where appropriate, the chapter seeks to develop 
and strengthen the key concepts and definitions of a security community. 
However, the evolution of the framework does not end here. Further 
developments to the framework are made as a consequence of the empirical 
insights in later chapters. Consequently, Chapter V contains an expanded 
conclusion that further develops the components of the framework relating 
to communal considerations and introduces ‘nation-building processes’ as a 
valuable addition to understanding collective identity formation within the 
region. Chapter VIII, the final and concluding chapter, also assesses some 
of the developments to the framework that are a consequence of this study. 
In the meantime, and in addition to above, this chapter aims to provide a 
conceptual map to which the experience of Southeast Asia can be set.  
Conceptual Foundations of Security Communities 
Figure 2.1 illustrates how the various concepts that define a security 
community relate and intermix. There are several primary branches of 
conceptual framework that stem from the words ‘security community’. These 
are security, integration, ‘dependable expectations of peaceful change’, 
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 community and society. The notion of security provides the foundation to 
which the remaining four conceptual frameworks can build upon. Integration, 
in its traditional sense, is the key component to the formation of dependable 
expectations of peaceful change. Community should be viewed as a continuation of 
the process of integration but moves beyond integration’s traditional 
boundaries through the consideration of the relationship between nation and 
state. It also recognises the existence of transnational communities and how 
they might impact on the emergence of a collective identity between the states 
that are thought to be composite members of a security community. Each of 
these inter-linked conceptual frameworks requires intricate explanations, 
which will continue to be reinforced in the remaining chapters of the 
dissertation. By comparison, the notion of society is relatively simple and is 
therefore included with the conceptual framework behind a community rather 
than as an independent category. The qualification of the meaning behind the 
notion of society is necessary in order to layer, or tier, the dissertation’s 
reference to groupings and people – for example, is the dissertation referring 
to all the people that reside within the defined territory of a state, or is it 
referring to a community that may be transnational in nature?  
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 Figure 2.1: Definitional and Conceptual Framework 
(d) Integration 
(c) ‘Dependable  
expectations of peaceful 
change’  
Definitional Framework 
(a) ‘Security’ Redefined 
(e) ‘Community’ & 
the concept of 
‘Community’ as a  
challenge to ‘Security 
Politics’ 
An indigenous definition 
to security in SEA 
CSCAP Minutes 
Traditional Security Non-Traditional Security 
(b) ‘Power’ Redefined 
The three  
Characteristics of 
a ‘Community’ 
(1) Shared identities, values 
and meanings 
(2) Multifaceted, direct and 
            indirect, interaction 
(3) The existence of  
reciprocity whereby there 
is a degree of long  term 
interest 
1. Illicit Drugs 
2. Environment 
3. Exploitation 
4. Illegal immigration 
5. Health and Disease 
6. Fishing 
7. Arms Trading 
8. ‘Other’ organized 
crime 
1. Intra and interre-
gional military 
threats 
2. Economic secu-
rity and stability 
3. Intrastate terror-
ism and armed 
(f) ‘Society’ defined 
Security Community 
 
Source: Compiled by author 
(a) Security 
In the traditional sense, the concept of security applied exclusively to the 
absence of a military threat to a sovereign state. Adler and Barnett apply the 
contemporary trend of broadening security to include ‘economic, 
environmental, and social welfare concerns’ (examples of these concerns are 
illustrated by the category of ‘non-traditional security’ in Figure 2.1).43 In 
contrast, Ramo Vayrynen44 criticises this approach and applies a narrow, 
                                                 
43 Adler and Barnett, "A Framework for the Study of Security Communities," p.4. 
44 Vayrynen, Stable Peace through Security Communities? Steps Towards Theory-Building (cited). 
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 realist definition.  Vayrynen has a point in arguing that a broad definition of 
security encompassing non-traditional security matters could destabilise the 
Deutschian framework and its application. That is, should a broad definition 
of security apply, there would be difficulty in the classification of a 
community of states in the event of a vis major (i.e. a plague or economic 
crisis). This neo-liberalist approach would result in a security community that 
is existent one week, nonexistent the next, and back again the week after. In 
light of this problem, Vayrynen defines security in the following terms: 
 [As a] ‘low past, present and future probability of using serious coercive 
force between or within nations’. Coercion can be both military and 
economic in nature as both of them can inflict major damage and pain on 
the targeted people. Peace is broken, and the security community 
unrealised in the region, if people are subjected to physical destruction 
and suffering. In other words, peace and security mean, ultimately, 
freedom from coercion and its threats’.45  
As the events that took place on 11 September have illustrated, terrorism now 
has an elevated capacity to impact on ‘peace and security’. Its existence as a 
‘serious coercive force between or within nations’ can exist at a level that is 
both military and economic in nature. Thus, not only did the terrorist 
destruction of the Twin Towers in New York critically impact upon the 
economy of the US (and shortly thereafter the economies of the globe) but it 
also resulted in a direct military response that was eventually targeted against 
the political elite of the state that was accused of harbouring the alleged 
terrorists responsible for the attacks. Therefore, in this dissertation, terrorism 
                                                 
45 Ibid.(cited). 
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 will be characterised as falling within the category and definition of 
‘traditional/hard-security’.46 
This dissertation does not intend to simply dismiss broader non-traditional 
security approaches. On the contrary, it will utilise the aforementioned 
definition of security as a threshold test for the existence of a security 
community and will be referred to as traditional security. However, once the 
application of this threshold test is satisfied, it will then be necessary to apply 
a broader definition of security that encompasses certain non-traditional 
concerns such as transnational crime (see Figure 2.1). To this end, the type of 
security framework that this dissertation has adopted as its overall umbrella is 
that labelled comprehensive security. The choice of this organising concept has 
been made partly because of its analytical integrity, its adaptability (particularly 
for the purpose of SCF) and its application to the states of Southeast Asia.47 
At the second meeting of the ARF on the 1st of August 1995, the ARF 
specifically referred to, and adopted, the notion of ‘comprehensive security’ 
and the Chair’s statement recognised that it included ‘not only military aspects 
but also political, economic, social and other issues’.48 In view of these 
                                                 
46 In an interview with Dr. K. S. Nathan, he states ‘I think this is very good, your discussion of 
hard security and soft security, and also the issue of terrorism, you have to now include the 
11 September issue … for the simple reason that it is real, that we cannot ignore it, it is real 
because the United States is a trend setter, it sets major trends in global politics like it did 
during the cold war’. Interview by Author with Dr. K.S. Nathan, ISEAS (Singapore), 6 
December 2001.  
47 Interview by Author with Bantarto Bandoro, CSIS (Jakarta), 26 November 2001. 
48 “Concepts of Comprehensive and Cooperative Security,” CSCAP Newsletter, no.6 (1997): p.1, 
see also: Peter King, "Australia and Southeast Asia: 'Comprehensive Engagement' or 
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 comments as well as other considerations – such as the impact upon security 
by forces such as globalisation – the Council on Security Cooperation in the 
Asia Pacific (CSCAP) formulated the following as an indigenous definition of 
comprehensive security in the Asia Pacific;49 ‘Comprehensive security is the 
pursuit of sustainable security in all fields (personal, political, economic, social, 
cultural, military, environmental) in both the domestic and external spheres, 
essentially through cooperative means’.50 Personal security is taken to mean 
freedom from oppression, exploitation, poverty and adequate medical 
attention; social security exists with the absence of drug trading, people 
smuggling, and general transnational crime; and cultural security is the 
community’s ability to refract external dilution of customs and practices. 
Reference to domestic security in this study is taken to mean the sum of all 
the factors that stem from the categories of both ‘personal’ and ‘social’ 
security. In this study, domestic security deliberately excludes cultural security 
as it is contended that, aside from raising an entirely separate debate (beyond 
the scope of this investigation), globalist forces are making it an increasingly 
difficult, if not impossible, ‘ideal’ to sustain.  
                                                                                                                        
Marriage of Convenience?," in Peace Building in the Asia Pacific Region: Perspectives from Japan and 
Australia, ed. Peter and Kibata King, Yoichi (St Leonards: Allen and Unwin, 1996), p.29. 
49 “Concepts of Comprehensive and Cooperative Security,” CSCAP Newsletter, no.6 (1997): p.1. 
50 Ibid, p.2. 
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 (b) Power 
Related to, or perhaps a subcategory of, the concept of security is that of 
power. It is argued that this is an example of an area where the realist paradigm 
continues to maintain its primacy. Some theoretical comment is necessary in 
this area as it has been generally accepted by political scientists that any theory 
or prediction as to the cause of conflict or peace, must pay due consideration 
to three levels of explanation: the individual, the state and the international 
system.51 As the aim of this dissertation does not require a detailed 
investigation of the theories in this realm, it is sufficient to say that the quest 
for power (or the fear of it) is not only central to the three levels but is also a 
key element in the cause of war and conflict. The power of a system of states, 
a state, a regime or a transnational community (such as a terrorist 
organisation) is defined by the total combination of military and economic 
capacity, as each of these can be equally destructive when used for personal 
gain.52 Background knowledge of the role of ‘power’ in international affairs is 
also necessary because of a fundamental assumption within the realist 
paradigm that states are rational actors (further qualified below). History 
provides ample support to this contention.53 It is also important to note that 
                                                 
51 Nazli Choucri and Robert C. North, "Roots of War: The Master Variables," in The Quest for 
Peace, ed. Raimo Vayrynen (London: Sage Publications, 1987), p.204. 
52 P.A. Reynolds, An Introduction to International Relations (London: 1980) p.117. 
53 Hans Morgenthau, War (Oxford: 1994) p.160. Some historical examples that have supported 
this contention have been provided by Michael Howard. He refers to the circumstances of 
the war between and Sparta and Athens as well as the Second World War. In 431 BC 
Sparta attacked Athens. The Athenians had spent many years continuously building 
their empire and had started to encroach upon Sparta’s allies. Thucydides wrote that 
‘what made war inevitable was the growth of Athenian Power and the fear this caused 
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 the actions of state-elites are constrained by the political processes of the state 
or organisation to which they are subject. At this level, any decision that could 
lead to conflict or war is made by a careful analysis of costs and benefits – 
that is, war will occur when it is believed to serve a state’s material interest, or 
alternatively, ‘national interest’.54 This argument therefore mirrors the realist 
contention of if not rational, then at least predictable, decisions at the 
leadership level. Two exceptions to this maxim are, firstly, when decisions are 
made under severe stress or duress; and secondly, when the decision making 
process is influenced by extremist ideology such as in the case of transnational 
terrorist communities.55 The inclusion of this framework is a further attempt 
to bridge the realist/constructivist divide. 
(c) Dependable Expectations of Peaceful Change 
Adler and Barnett break down this key concept to its two companion 
elements, that is, ‘dependable expectations’ and ‘peaceful change’.56 The 
authors contend that ‘dependable expectations’ is best considered by 
reference to the various theories of social interaction. Dependable 
                                                                                                                        
in Sparta’. Likewise, in 1914 many of the German people, and in 1939 nearly all of the 
British, felt justified in going to war not over any specific issue of conflict, but simply 
to maintain the balance of power and the status quo, Michael Howard, The Causes of 
War and Other Essays (Sussex: Temple Smith, 1983) p.16. 
54 Brian R. Ferguson, "Anthropology of War: Theory, Politics and Ethics," (Sussex: 1987), p.151-
2. 
55 However, the realist school of thought might argue that even in the case of extremist terrorist 
organisation’s there remains a degree of rationally so long as the analysis considers the 
concept of power and there idea of gain, that is, gain at any cost including the lives of its 
own members of the decision maker him or herself.  
56 Adler and Barnett, "A Framework for the Study of Security Communities," p.34. 
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 expectations can exist where the actors have shared identities (discussed below) 
where identities are shaped by their environment. This belief, as opposed to 
the realist explanation for the absence of war, is very much a part of the 
constructivist paradigm and the contentions of Deutsch. While accepting the 
contentions of Adler and Barnett on this point, this dissertation further 
advocates the continued inclusion of the realist formulation and the 
aforementioned comments on the ‘role’ of power in contemporary international 
and regional politics. The reasons for this are that if a political scientist 
commences an analysis of a community of states under the realist paradigm, 
an objective overview and general prognosis of the subject may be obtained. 
The analysis can then move into a deeper examination of the degree of 
collective identity that exists within the community of states and the various 
socially constructed norms that act to inhibit conflictual relations. In fact, 
both the realist and constructivist models have a degree of overlap and it is 
contended that they can fit and work together to assist in the understanding 
of state and community actions. The realist paradigm is the stepping stone 
and the constructivist paradigm is the polishing cloth, to the theorist’s 
analysis.  
The second of the companion elements to the concept is ‘peaceful change’. 
Adler and Barnett argue that peaceful change can be best defined as ‘neither 
the expectation of nor the preparation for organized violence as a means to 
settle interstate disputes’.57 In order to satisfy this criterion, it is assumed that 
                                                 
57 Ibid. 
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 states do not prepare for or even consider security actions that would or could 
be interpreted by others as representing a threat to another state or 
community’s hard-security. Thus, if a security community was to exist in the 
absence of ‘well-developed strategic ties or formal alliance’ then there would 
at least be ‘tacit and/or formal normative prohibitions against states settling 
their disputes through military means’.58 The degree to which either strategic 
ties and formal alliances, or normative prohibitions against conflict exist, is 
directly proportional to the degree of integration that subsists between and 
throughout the states of a community.  
The existence of confidence and security building measures (CSBMs), 
preventative diplomacy and dispute resolution procedures, assist in a finding 
of peaceful change. CSBMs are defined as actions which fall into one of four 
categories: the exchange of information and/or increasing communication 
between the parties; the exchange of observers and/or the implementation of 
inspections; an established set of rules for specific types of military 
operations; and the application of restraints on the operation and readiness of 
military forces.59 Preventative diplomacy is defined as ‘action taken in 
vulnerable places and time to avoid the threat or use of armed force and 
related forms of coercion by states or groups to settle the political disputes 
that can arise from the destabilizing effects of economic, social, political and 
                                                 
58 Ibid., p.35. 
59 Marie-Francis Desjardins, "Rethinking Confidence-Building Measures," ADELPHI, no. 307 
(1996): p.5. 
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 international change’.60 In the context of this dissertation, prevention requires 
that the deepest roots of a conflict be addressed by the countries within 
Southeast Asia.61 Preventative diplomacy focuses predominately on the period 
‘in which violence is imminent or early but still short of mass deadly 
conflict’.62 Conflict management or conflict resolution is concerned with 
limiting the spread of disputes in the event that they have escalated and 
preventative diplomacy has failed.63 
It has been argued that CSBMs result in an increased transparency to 
government actions which facilitates greater trust, we-ness and a reduction in 
the likelihood of armed conflict.64 CSBMs reduce the likelihood of tensions 
emerging in the first place. However, it is contended that preventative 
diplomacy and dispute resolution procedures will only come into play once a 
sufficient level of trust between a given set of states has been established. 
They are a consequence of a degree of ‘we-ness’, empathy and collective 
identity formation. Thus, when there exists sufficient institutionalisation and 
adequate levels of CSBMs, preventative diplomacy and disputes resolution 
procedures there will then exist, ipso facto, reasonably dependable expectations 
                                                 
60 Jentleson, ‘Opportunities Missed, Opportunities Seized’, p.10 
61 However, this does not require that all the countries must actively seek to engage in 
preventative diplomacy, but rather, that an appropriate body of states or organisation (such 
as ASEAN) has a legitimate means of exercising some type of action that would constitute 
a practice of preventative diplomacy. 
62 Jentleson, ‘Opportunities Missed, Opportunities Seized’, p.10 
63 Ibid. 
64 Desjardins, "Rethinking Confidence-Building Measures," p.18. 
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 of peaceful change and the requisite level of collective identify formation to 
constitute at the very least, a nascent security community. This link between 
collective identity formation and dependable expectations of peaceful change 
is further evidence of how it is impossible to completely dissect the two issues 
in any security community study. The only distinction that can be made is the 
degree of emphasis placed on the two concepts in each chapter. On this basis, 
CSBMs, preventative diplomacy and conflict resolution procedures will be 
considered throughout the body of the dissertation and will be evaluated in 
their entirety within Chapter VIII. 
(d) Integration 
In the current context, the study of integration is concerned with ‘how and 
why states voluntarily mingle, merge, and mix with their neighbours so as to 
lose several factual attributes of sovereignty’.65 In its classical form, integration 
is one of the key factors in providing a security community’s ‘dependable 
expectations of peaceful change’. Deutsch states that integration begins at 
virtually any moment that both sides cease to fear or prepare for war.66 
Barnett and Adler would add to this the requirement that these habits of 
peaceful exchange be entrenched to an extent that would exclude the 
declaration of a security community between states that form an overnight 
                                                 
65 Kacowicz, Regionalization, Globalization, and Nationalism: Convergent, Divergent or Overlapping? 
(cited). 
66 Adler and Barnett, "A Framework for the Study of Security Communities," p.35. 
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 alliance, only to renege the next day.67 While integration is a question of fact, 
rather than time, it is contended that by necessity, there should be a degree of 
consistency and evolution towards a situation of anticipated and actual peace 
between nations. What has just been described is a ‘process’ but integration 
also represents an ‘end state’ or the end of a means. That is, it is on the 
integration of states and communities that a community of states will be 
formed.68 Following this, the degree of integration that exists determines 
whether a community should be classified as anywhere between an embryonic 
security community and a tightly coupled security community (the meaning of 
these terms are discussed below).   
(e) ‘Community’ and  (f) ‘Society’ 
To date, the concept of community within SCFs has not been considered in 
relationship to the concepts within other related frameworks and has been 
lacking in structural hierarchy.69 In part, this has been because many scholars, 
particularly from the realist school of thought, have criticised the term 
community as lacking any practical resemblance to the international system of 
states. However, from the onset of his work, Deutsch envisioned that the 
development of a stable peace was inseparable from the existence of a 
                                                 
67 Ibid. 
68 Evans and Newnham, eds., The Penguin Dictionary of International Relations p.253. 
69 For example, cooperative security, the relevance of nation-building to collective identity 
formation and security sector reform theory.  
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 transnational community.70 Time has given weight to Deutsch’s vision and in this 
new transnationalist relations phase of global politics, theorists have been 
presented with a unique opportunity to reconsider past beliefs and theories. 
Consequently, sociologists have returned to the concept in recent years and 
attempted to examine the conditions under which groups of ‘actors form 
relations that can be theoretically and empirically catalogued as 
communities’.71 In this realm, the dissertation will attempt to overcome some 
of the analytical problems of the term community while highlighting in practical 
terms, the increasing relevance and significance of its study in the 
development of a security community. 
A review of the scholarly literature reveals three key components to the 
existence of a community.72 According to Karklins, the first and perhaps most 
important component is the existence of a collective identity (see Figure 2.1). 
Consistent with the aforementioned philosophy behind constructivism, a 
central element of a collective identity is the belief that an identity can be socially 
constructed. Identity is defined as a sense of belonging to some type of 
citizenship or population and this sense of ‘belonging’ may exist at any level 
                                                 
70 Deutsch et al., Political Community and the North Atlantic Area: International Organisation in the Light 
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71 Acharya, "Collective Identity and Conflict Management in Southeast Asia," p.31, Adler and 
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72 Adler and Barnett, "A Framework for the Study of Security Communities," p.31. 
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 including the local, domestic, state, regional and global.73 Additionally, the 
emergence of a ‘collective identity’ is assisted by a pluralist formation of 
shared values and meanings. These common identities, meanings and values 
are the key to both a transnational and intersubjective understanding. A 
transnational understanding provides a common language to communicate a 
social reality and a ‘common understanding of certain norms’ where as 
common meanings create a ‘common reference world’ where there exist 
common actions, celebrations, and feelings.74 This sense of ‘belonging’ is 
analogous to what Adler and Barnett refer to as a ‘shared identity’.75 However, 
in order to avoid confusion, the remainder of the dissertation will utilise and 
refer only to Karklins’ concept of a ‘collective identity’. 
As per Figure 2.1, the second factor in the construction of a community is the 
requirement that the interaction occurring within a community is direct and 
numerous in its types of setting. Labelling it the transactionalist approach, 
Deutsch utilised a wide range of indicators in the measurement of integration. 
These include ‘international trade, mail flows, student exchanges and travel’.76 
In contrast to the definition provided by Adler, it is argued that such contact 
and transactions between communities need not be proximate. This is 
                                                 
73 Prof. Dr. Rasma Karklins, "The Concept of Collective Identity" (paper presented at the 
Directorate of Communication and Research, Strasbourg, 17-18 April 2001), p.1. 
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75 Ibid. 
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 because of a continuing increase in the processes of globalisation and the 
partial elimination of time and space. As a result, there has been a growing 
recognition of the fact that a community can exist over increasing distances to 
the extent where there might eventually exist one single global community.77 
For the time being, however, it is possible to imagine a kind of Wallerstein-
type core and periphery in the existence of community at the global and 
regional levels.78 This would occur where the core, represented by the 
industrialised world, has access to the type of community building 
technologies such as internet and email that would enable it to form a 
common identity leading to the creation of a community.  By contrast, the 
periphery, represented by the still underdeveloped world, embodies a 
fragmented community where globalisation has merely increased the divide 
between societies. Finally, as in Figure 2.1, the third requirement to the 
existence of a community is that there exists a practice of reciprocity, which 
indicates a ‘sense of long-term interest’ – that is, knowledge of, and between, 
the groups within the community. Additionally, there would potentially exist a 
sense of obligation towards, and a responsibility for, the members of the 
community.79  
                                                 
77 Ira J. Cohen, "Structuralisation Theory and Social Praxis," in Social Theory Today, ed. Anthony 
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 By comparison, it is important to note that the existence of a community in 
general does not of necessity dictate dependable expectations of peaceful 
change. That is, while there might be norms to regulate a community’s 
security and to foster order, there is no guarantee of a mechanism for non-
violent dispute resolution. Adler and Barnett in fact recognised that some 
communities could be categorised as ‘war communities’.80 It is dependable 
expectations of peaceful change that distinguish security communities from 
other communities.81 Additionally, in partial answer to the critique at the 
beginning of this section, an exclusive use of the term ‘community’ will be 
incorporated into the dissertation. The reference to community will 
continue to apply in the Deutschian sense but may only apply to particular 
segments of the society within the states referred to. Therefore, as argued by 
Amitav Acharya, the existence of a community may exist only at the state 
elite level while failing to embrace the rest of society.82 Society itself is defined 
as the entire portion of a populace that exists within the territorial 
boundaries of a state.83 By contrast to community, in this dissertation the 
term ‘society’ possesses an inclusive rather than exclusive connotation.   
                                                 
80 Adler and Barnett, "A Framework for the Study of Security Communities," p.34. 
81 Ibid. 
82 Acharya, "Collective Identity and Conflict Management in Southeast Asia," pp.207-14. 
83 McLean, Concise Dictionary of Politics p.461. 
 41
 Security Community Structure 
Figure 2.2 attempts to depict the constituent elements of a security 
community, drawing in part on the insights of Adler and Barnett. However, 
Adler and Barnett’s description of the terms in Figure 2.2 is more likely to 
misguide rather than enlighten the reader on the structure behind a security 
community. For example, the authors’ discuss two ideal types of security 
community, loosely and tightly coupled.84 They then move on to what could 
appear to be three further levels of integration within a security community, 
being nascent, ascendant and mature. The authors again discuss the various 
factors that establish either a loosely coupled or tightly coupled security 
community.85 However, this two-fold discussion leaves the reader wondering 
whether a tightly coupled security community is necessary to the emergence 
of a mature security community or whether a mature security community is 
necessary before a loosely coupled86 security community can arise? 
Additionally, what can only be described as a subjective framework of analysis 
is defined by at least five subcategories. The need to simplify this criterion, as 
has been a stated goal of this dissertation, has been admirably attempted by 
Amitav Acharya in the recent publication, Constructing a Security Community in 
Southeast Asia: ASEAN and the Problem of Regional Order. Acharya condenses 
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 Adler’s twenty-eight pages into less than one.87 While Acharya’s summation 
may have swung the pendulum to the opposite extreme by oversimplifying 
the framework, Acharya does succeed in addressing some of the ambiguity 
left over from Adler and Barnett’s work.  
Figure 2.2: Security Community Structuralisation 
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Source: Compiled by author 
Following Acharya, and (in part), to alleviate the ambiguities in the work of 
Adler and Barnett, it can be contended that Figure 2.2 illustrates the 
integrational hierarchy that exists within a SCF, starting with a ‘nascent 
security community’ and concluding with a ‘tightly coupled mature security 
                                                 
87 Acharya, Constructing a Security Community in Southeast Asia: ASEAN and the Problem of Regional 
Order pp.34-35. 
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 community’. A nascent security community emerges with the existence of 
triggering mechanisms such as mutual threat perceptions, joint trade benefits, 
collective identities and the duplication of other organizational structures such 
as the European Union.88 As reflected by the title of this dissertation, there is 
some academic consensus that Southeast Asia now constitutes a nascent 
security community.89 Within the ascendant phase, one can begin to witness 
greater levels of interstate integration with the military (such as joint exercises, 
training and cooperation), a heightened sense of security between states, and 
the beginnings of cognitive transition towards inter-subjective processes and 
collective identities encouraging ‘dependable expectations of peaceful change’. 
In the mature phase, there is a greater degree of institutionalism, 
supranationalism and multilateralism with a substantive degree of trust (such 
as unfortified borders) and virtually no possibility of a military conflict.90  
To continue up the hierarchy, a mature security community may be either 
loosely or tightly coupled. A tightly coupled security community includes all 
the factors that constitute a loosely coupled, that is, a mature security 
community. Additionally, it requires the existence of substantial cooperative 
and collective security, a high level of integration between the military, joint 
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 policy coordination against internal threats, unrestricted movement of 
societies between states, the internalisation of authority and a 
multiperspectival policy where rule is shared at the national, transnational and 
supranational levels. In the event that a security community disintegrates then 
the community may either form what is defined as a regional security complex 
(or some other regional framework) or be absorbed into a larger regional 
security complex (discussed below).  
Towards a Defensible Concept 
As illustrated by Figure 2.3, this dissertation develops the framework by 
introducing the notion of an embryonic security community (as alluded to by Jones 
and Smith).91 During the embryonic phase of a security community’s 
evolution, there is little certainty as to whether the relations between states 
will undertake a future and sustainable course towards ‘dependable 
expectations of peaceful change’. Many of the factors pertaining to the 
existence of a nascent security community are also existent at the embryonic 
phase but are either insufficiently bedded, or insufficient in number, to 
evidence that a community of states has irreversibly accepted a continual 
process of integration and interaction. In other words, expectations of 
peaceful change are nothing more than transient in nature. By contrast, a 
nascent security community evolves where there exists adequate empirical evidence 
to illustrate a future and sustainable course towards ‘dependable expectations of 
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 peaceful change’. An ascendant security community will advance where there 
are reasonably dependable expectations of peaceful change and such a 
condition may be indicated by the existence of a long-term peace – in 
addition to the factors discussed in the section, ‘Security Community 
Structure’ above.  
A mature security community only exists where there are absolutely no 
foreseeable prospects of conflict as well as absolute expectations of peaceful 
change. A higher level of integration would further distinguish between a 
mature security community and a tightly coupled security community. An 
example of the type of infrastructure required to satisfy this test would be the 
European Union. The use of the term ‘loosely coupled security community’ is 
irrelevant as it merely reflects the criteria of a mature security community 
within the framework of this dissertation. The elimination of this term further 
simplifies and clarifies the framework. The definition of a tightly coupled 
security community is applied in the same manner as by Adler and Barnett, 
where ‘there is a ‘mutual aid society’ providing for collective and cooperative 
efforts to help each other and offer joint solutions to common problems’.92 
This addition to the previous framework provides a clear demarcation of 
relevant empirical factors that satisfy the criteria for each level of a SCF. The 
requirement of ‘absolutism’ in the definitional analysis reduces the ambiguity 
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 of the framework – a framework that could otherwise be extremely subjective 
in nature. 
Figure 2.3: Amended Security Community Structuralisation 
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To date, some academics have contended that a ‘Security Community 
Framework’ is interested in the prevention of war rather than the 
development of security cooperation between states.93 Against this 
contention, the criteria provided by Deutsch as well as Adler and Barnett, 
dictate the need for security cooperation as one of the requirements of the 
‘community building’ process. An example of a community evolving to such a 
                                                 
93 Amitav Acharya, Re: Research Trip to Singapore - an Investigation of Security Community Framework in 
Southeast Asia [E-mail] (2001 [cited 21 September 2001]). In this correspondence Amitav 
Acharya states that he is not sure whether the ‘…security approach will hold for piracy. Its 
more about avoiding war than developing specific forms of security cooperation…’ 
 47
 super-integrational level would be the existence of a joint state naval 
operation to remove piracy from the Malacca Straits. Other examples would 
include regional cooperation to inhibit the production and movement of illicit 
drugs, both in the intraregional and interregional sense. These concepts will 
be further developed and applied in Chapter VI. 
Security Communities in Theoretical Perspective 
The concept of a security community has become fashionable not just 
because of the end of the Cold War but also because of developments in 
political science, which are now exploring the role of ‘identities, norms and 
the social basis of global politics’.94 Additionally, new theoretical 
developments have enabled scholars to overcome what Adler and Barnett 
considered to be ‘methodological difficulties’ in Deutsch’s framework.95 The 
political science and international relations theories that explain the absence 
of war can be conceptualised along a spectrum of whether or not they see 
‘structure’ as comprised of material forces or material and social normative forces. 
At one extreme sits the theory of realism, which is completely material in its 
analysis as well as asocial. At the opposite end of the spectrum sits 
constructivism, which views the international environment as a social 
construction that comprises ‘collective understandings’ including norms that 
emerge from social interaction. Norms are defined as the ‘standard of 
                                                 
94 Adler and Barnett, "Security Communities in Theoretical Perspective," 4-5. 
95 Ibid., p.10. 
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 appropriate behaviour for actors with a given identity’.96 Within this paradigm, 
society is both normative and material (contains both rules and resources) and 
where there is the possibility for the evolution of both shared identities and 
norms that can create a stable peace. The various theories of neo-liberal 
institutionalism, society of states and the Kantian perspective, sit amidst these 
two ends of the spectrum.97 
According to the scholarly literature, a SCF exists as one of at least five 
separate multilateral security frameworks alternatively known as community based 
cooperative orders.98 Figure 2.4 illustrates the spectrum of orders that exist within 
this multilateralist framework. An international system/society was referred to 
in Chapter I and while it mirrors the ‘community’ component of the SCF, it 
attempts to apply the theory at a global level and in the absence of any in-
depth consideration of the conceptual components to ‘security’ (defined in 
Chapter II). By contrast, the most basic of these orders is the concert system. 
This is created where there is a consensus amongst the greater powers of the 
globe that they will collectively manage regional security relations. The scope 
of this notion is limited and certainly of little help when examining individual 
                                                 
96 Markus Hund, The Development of ASEAN Norms between 1997 and 2000: A Paradigm Shift? 
[Internet - Occasional Paper] (Center for East Asian and Strategic Studies, 2001 [cited 20 
July 2002]); available from www.zops.uni-trier.de/op/OccasionalPapersNr15.pdf. 
97 Adler and Barnett, "Security Communities in Theoretical Perspective," pp.9-13. 
98 Buzan, "Book Review: Adler and Barnett, 'Security Communities'.", John G. Ikenberry and 
Jitsuo Tsyuchiyama, Between Balance of Power and Community: The Future of Multilateral Security 
Cooperation in the Asia Pacific [Conference] (The Center for International Political Economy 
and The James A. Baker III Institute for Public Policy, Rice University, 2000 [cited 
September 10 2001]); available from 
<http://www.rice.edu/projects/baker/Pubs/studies/jescgem/fmscap4/fmscap.html>. 
 49
 states or regions. Secondly, there is the notion of a common security association, 
which is an aligned grouping of states that are associated with a particular 
ideology such as communism – an example of this was the former Soviet 
Union. A third alternative is the classic collective security system, which stems 
from the ideology of Woodrow Wilson and the League of Nations.99 It would 
seem that like the SCF and international system framework, the concept of 
collective security is strongly related to the formation of a collective identity. 
However, unlike a collective security system, the criteria utilised for the 
establishment of a security community go far beyond a mere reliance on 
collective identity at the elite level to include earlier factors such as 
community, pluralism and integration. Adler and Barnet aptly state the 
conceptual superiority of a SCF in the following terms, ‘[t]he concept of a 
security community posits the possible relationship between the growth of a 
community and pacific relations, and offers a more exacting and demanding 
explanation of a stable peace, but also more fully opens up the sociological 
bottle’.100  
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 Figure 2.4: Competing Multilateral Security Frameworks 
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